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Abstract—In a multi-hop wireless access network, where each
node is an independent self-interested commercial entity, pricing
is helpful not only to encourage collaboration but also to utilize
the network resources efﬁciently. In this paper, we propose a
market-based model with two-fold pricing (TFP) for wireless
access networks. In our model, the relay-pricing is used to
encourage nodes to forward packets for other nodes. Each node
receives a payment for the relay service that it provides. We
also consider interference-pricing to leverage optimal resource
allocation. Together, the relay and interference prices incorpo-
rate both cooperative and competitive interactions among the
nodes. We prove that TFP guarantees positive proﬁt for each
individual wireless node for a wide range of pricing functions.
The proﬁt increases as the node forwards more packets. Thus,
the cooperative nodes are well rewarded. We then determine the
relay and interference pricing functions such that the network
social welfare and the aggregate network utility are maximized.
Simulation results show that, compared to two recently proposed
single-fold pricing models, where only the relay or only the
interference prices are considered, our proposed TFP scheme
signiﬁcantly increases the total network proﬁt as well as the
aggregate network throughput. TFP also leads to more fair
revenue sharing among the wireless relay nodes.
Index Terms—Multi-hop wireless access networks, two-fold
pricing, network optimization, social welfare, interference.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various pricing schemes have recently been proposed either
to encourage collaboration among the network elements or to
utilize the network resources efﬁciently. Pricing as a tool for
resource allocation was ﬁrst proposed in [1], [2] for conges-
tion control among elastic trafﬁc sources. In this regard, the
network is designed to solve a network utility maximization
(NUM) problem across all trafﬁc sources, subject to the link
capacity constraints. The corresponding Lagrange multipliers
are interpreted as the congestion prices. Each source which
uses a link resource is charged with the link’s congestion
price. The transmission rates and the congestion prices are
iteratively updated using the gradient projection method until
the global optimal network utility is achieved. The work in [1]
has been extended to other resource allocation problems such
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as medium access control, power control, frequency channel
assignment, and spectrum sharing [3]–[9]. Recently, it has also
been shown that the gradient updates can be replaced by the
best-response updates to achieve faster convergence and more
robust performance [10]–[12].
Another thread of research focuses on using pricing to
encourage collaboration among the nodes [13]–[21]. In a
multi-hop network, where the nodes need to forward packets
for other nodes, the optimal network performance might be
at the cost of performance degradation for some intermediate
relay nodes. When the intermediate nodes have no incentive
to collaborate, the well-known forwarder’s dilemma (cf. [22])
can occur, where no node forwards the packets for other
nodes. To resolve this problem, incentives can be offered to
the relay nodes in the form of payments or rewards in turn
for their help in forwarding other nodes’s trafﬁc. In general,
achieving the optimal network performance may not be always
guaranteed in the incentive-based strategies as they mainly take
the individual proﬁt objectives into consideration. The problem
of designing pricing models for Internet service providers
(ISPs) in a ﬁxed wired network has been studied in [14]–[17].
In [16], Davoli et al. considered the pricing problem where the
ISPs do not have any knowledge about users’ utility functions.
The pricing models for wired networks cannot be easily
extended to wireless networks. There are two main challenging
issues that need to be addressed in wireless access networks:
channel imperfection (e.g., wireless fading), and interference.
In [18], Neely proposed an economic model for wireless
ad-hoc networks, with stochastic channel states, within the
general framework of backpressure algorithms [23], [24]. The
relay prices are used to encourage packet forwarding. How-
ever, it is essentially assumed that the network is interference-
free. Interference-free pricing is also studied in [25], [26].
In general, most of the previously proposed pricing models
in the literature have one or more of the following performance
bottlenecks: (1) network resources are not efﬁciently (i.e.,
optimally) allocated, (2) individual proﬁts are not taken into
consideration, and (3) interference among the wireless trans-
missions is not taken into account. In this paper, we address
these performance bottlenecks in all three aspects. In particu-
lar, we extend the work by Neely [18] and propose a market-
based network model with two-fold pricing (TFP) which fully
incorporates the effect of interference. Our model uses relay-
pricing to encourage nodes to collaborate and forward each
other’s packets. We also use interference-pricing to encourage2
the wireless relay nodes to properly share the common network
resources. Together, the relay and interference prices incorpo-
rate both cooperative and competitive interactions among the
nodes. We analytically prove that for a wide range of pricing
functions, our proposed TFP scheme leads to a guaranteed
positive proﬁt for each individual node. The proﬁt increases
as the node forwards more packets. This better pays off the
collaborative nodes. Finally, assuming the presence of slow-
fading channels, we obtain the relay and interference pricing
functions for a multi-hop wireless network such that not only
the positive individual proﬁts are guaranteed, but also the
network social welfare and the network utility are maximized.
Compared with the single-fold relay pricing model in [18]
as well as the single-fold interference pricing model in [10],
simulation results show that our TFP scheme increases the
social welfare and the network throughput signiﬁcantly. It also
leads to more fair revenue sharing among the nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our proposed
pricing model is described in Section II. The key properties of
our model are analytically proved in Section III. Simulation
results are presented in Section IV. The paper is concluded in
Section V. All the proofs are given in the Appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a stationary wireless access network. Let N, with
size jNj = N, denote the set of wireless relay nodes and
L, with size jLj = L, denote the set of all unidirectional
wireless links. For each node n2N, the set of all incoming
and outgoing links are denoted by Lin
n ½ L and Lout
n ½ L,
respectively. We also deﬁne N in
n = fm : (m;n) 2 Lin
ng and
N out
n =fm:(n;m)2Lout
n g as the set of in-neighbors and the
set of out-neighbors of node n, respectively. Wireless relay
nodes are assumed to be independent commercial entities.
Together, they form a wireless backbone to provide connec-
tivity among wireless users in a multi-hop manner. The set
of users is denoted by D, with size jDj = D. Each relay
node n 2 N offers connectivity only to a subset of users,
denoted by Dn ½ D. Each user is offered connectivity from
exactly one wireless relay node. All users i;j2Dn are able to
communicate directly with each other. However, if any user
i 2 Dn wants to send data to another user k 2 Dc, where
c2Nnfng, it should ﬁrst transfer the data to node n, and the
data are then transferred to node c via the intermediate wireless
relay nodes before delivering to user k. In turn, node n charges
user i for its offered connectivity service. We assume that all
wireless relay nodes communicate over the same frequency
band which is different from those frequency bands used by
the users to communicate with each other and their associated
wireless relay nodes. This avoids interference between access
and relay transmissions. However, the transmissions among
the wireless relay nodes can still interfere with each other. A
sample wireless access network is shown in Fig. 1. In this
ﬁgure, there are N = 6 wireless relay nodes, labeled as n, m,
s, a, b, and c. There are also D = 15 wireless users.
Each wireless relay node n 2 N is assumed to have N ¡1
separate queues to store the incoming data according to their
ﬁnal destination. All data that are destined to any of the users
Fig. 1. A sample multi-hop wireless access network with six wireless relay
nodes, labeled as n;m;s;a;b;c, and ﬁfteen wireless users. Here Dn = fi;jg
and k 2 Dc. Users i and j can directly communicate with each other.
However, if user i (or user j) wants to send data to user k, it should ﬁrst
transfer data to its associated wireless relay node (i.e., node n), and the data
are then transferred to wireless relay node c via the intermediate nodes (e.g.,
nodes s and a) in a multi-hop manner before being delivered to user k. In
turn for the provided connectivity service, wireless relay node n and all the
intermediate relay nodes are paid according to their offered relay prices.
of relay node c 2 Nnfng are stored in the cth queue. The
contents of the cth queue are called commodity c data. For
each commodity c data, node n maintains a set H
(c)
n µN out
n ,
which includes its neighboring relay nodes with minimum hop-
counts to node c and can potentially relay commodity c data
towards node c. For example, H
(c)
n = fm;sg, H
(c)
m = fag,
H
(c)
s =fag, and H
(c)
a =fcg in Fig. 1.
Time is divided into equal-length slots T =f0;1;2;:::g. For
each link (n;m) 2 L, let ­nm denote the set of all possible
channel states. Channel states can vary (e.g., due to wireless
fading). At each time slot t2T , the current channel state is
denoted by !nm(t) 2 ­nm. We stack up the channel states
of all links at time t and denote the obtained L £ 1 vector
by !(t). That is, !(t)=(wnm(t); 8n;m2N; (n;m)2L).
Let T! µT denote the set of time slots at which the channel
state vector ! changes. We assume that ! has an independent
and identical distribution (i.i.d.) over time slots T!. We also
assume the slow-fading scenario such that
jt2 ¡ t1j ¸ ¤; 8 t1;t2 2 T!; (1)
where ¤ À 1. That is, two consecutive changes in channel
states occur at least ¤ time slots away. We will consider the
fast fading case (i.e., when ¤ ! 1) in Section IV.
For each wireless relay node n 2 N and any of its
neighboring nodes m 2 N out
n , let ¹
(c)
nm(p(t);w(t)) ¸ 0 denote
the transmission rate offered to commodity c data over link
(n;m) during time slot t. Here, p(t) = (p
(c)
nm(t); 8 n;m 2
N; 8c2Nnfng; (n;m)2L) denotes the L(N ¡1)£1 vector
of transmission powers for all links and all commodities. The
scalar p
(c)
nm(t)¸0 denotes the transmission power correspond-
ing to the transmission of commodity c data over link (n;m).
At each time slot t 2 T and for each wireless relay node
n 2 N, the commodity c 2 Nnfng data transmission rate
over wireless link (n;m) 2 Lout
n can be modeled as [27]
¹(c)
nm(p(t);w(t))=As log
Ã
1+
K hnm !nm(t) p
(c)
nm(t)
Inm(p¡n(t)) + ´m
!
; (2)3
where As denotes the channel symbol rate, K is the pro-
cessing gain, ´m denotes the noise power at the receiver
node m, hnm is the channel power gain from relay node
n to relay node m, p¡n(t) = (p
(d)
ms(t); 8 m 2 Nnfng; s 2
N out
m ; d 2 Nnfmg) denotes the transmission power of all
nodes other than node n, and Inm(p¡n(t)) is the aggregate
interference power on link (n;m). Notice that the term
K hnm !nm(t) p
(c)
nm(t)=(Inm(p¡n(t)) + ´m) is the signal to
interference plus noise ratio (SINR) for commodity c data
transmissions over link (n;m). We have
Inm(p¡n(t))=
X
a2Nnfng
ham
0
@
X
d2Nnfng
X
b2N out
a
p
(d)
ab (t)
1
A: (3)
Each node n2N limits its total transmission power such that P
c2Nnfng
P
m2N out
n p
(c)
nm · Pmax
n , where Pmax
n > 0. Thus,
the transmission rates are always bounded. We deﬁne
¹max, in
n = max
p;!
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N in
n
¹(c)
mn(p;w); (4)
and
¹max, out
n = max
p;!
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
¹(c)
nm(p;w); (5)
as the maximum data rate on any incoming and any outgoing
link of node n2N, respectively.
A. Two-Fold Relay and Interference Pricing
1) Pricing among the wireless relay nodes: In our market-
based model, at any time slot t 2 T , if wireless relay node
n 2 N transmits commodity c data with rate ¹
(c)
nm(p(t);w(t))
to its neighboring wireless relay node m 2 N out
n , then it
pays ¹
(c)
nm(p(t);w(t)) Á
(c)
m (t) units of currency to node m as
relay service charge. Here Á
(c)
m (t)¸0 denotes the relay price
corresponding to commodity c data, advertised by wireless
relay node m. In total, at time slot t, node n pays
X
c2Nnfng
¹(c)
nm(p(t);w(t)) Á(c)
m (t) (6)
units of currency to any neighboring node m 2 N out
n as relay
service charge. Similarly, in total, node n receives
0
@
X
c2Nnfng
¹(c)
mn(p(t);w(t))
1
AÁ(c)
n (t) (7)
currency units from any node m2N in
n for offered relay service.
Besides the mutual relay services that the neighboring nodes
offer to each other, they also affect each other’s operation
through interference power as shown in (2) and (3). From (3),
for each node n 2 N, the higher the total transmission power P
c2Nnfng
P
m2N out
n p
(c)
nm(t), the greater is the interference
power that relay node n causes on other nodes. In our pricing
model, at each time slot t, wireless relay node n pays
0
@
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
p(c)
nm(t)
1
A Ã(n)
a (t) (8)
units of currency to each node a2Nnfng as interference com-
pensation charge. Here Ã
(n)
a (t) ¸ 0 denotes the interference
price informed by node a to node n. Unlike the relay prices
which vary depending on the commodity data, the interference
prices are the same for all commodities as the contents of the
transmissions do not affect their interference level. Instead, the
interference prices may vary depending on the node locations.
The closer two relay nodes are located, the higher is the
corresponding channel gain. This results in higher interference
power and consequently higher interference price. Similar to
(8), at each time slot t 2 T , node n receives
0
@
X
d2Nnfag
X
b2N out
a
p
(d)
ab (t)
1
A Ã(a)
n (t) (9)
units of currency from node a as the compensation for the
interference node a causes on the transmissions of node n.
For each wireless relay node n 2 N and at any time slot
t 2 T , let U
(c)
n (t) denote the current commodity c 2 Nnfng
queue backlog. We deﬁne
U(t) =
³
U(c)
n (t); 8n2N; 8c2Nnfng
´
(10)
as the vector of queue backlogs in all wireless relay nodes
at time slot t. For each c 2 Nnfng, the corresponding relay
price is assumed to be set as
Á(c)
n (t) = ©(c)
n (U(t ¡ ¨);:::;U(t);p(t ¡ ¨);:::;p(t)):
(11)
Furthermore, for each a 2 Nnfng, the corresponding relay
price is assumed to be set as
Ã(a)
n (t) = ª(a)
n (U(t ¡ ¨);:::;U(t);p(t ¡ ¨);:::;p(t)):
(12)
Here, ©
(c)
n (¢) and ª
(a)
n (¢) are two non-negative real scalar
pricing functions of all queue backlogs and all transmission
powers at time slots ft ¡ ¨;t ¡ ¨ + 1;:::;tg. These pricing
functions are general. We only make a few assumptions.
Assumption 1: If U
(c)
n (t) > 0, then ©
(c)
n (¢) > 0. That
is, if wireless relay node n already has some backlogged
commodity c data, then it will not offer free relay service.
Assumption 2: If
X
c2Nnfng
U(c)
n (t) > 0 (13)
and X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
p(c)
nm(t) > 0; (14)
then
ª(m)
n (¢) > 0: (15)
That is, if relay node n has any backlogged data and it is
currently transmitting some data on at least one of its outgoing
links, it will not set its advertised interference prices to zero.
Assumption 3: Price ©
(c)
n is increasing in U
(c)
n (t).
Assumption 4: There exists a large enough but bounded
constant V max
n such that for any commodity c 2 Nnfng and
any time slot t 2 T , Á
(c)
n (t) · V max
n U
(c)
n (t). In general, the4
unbounded sets of time slots at which the vector of relay prices
Á(t) =
³
Á(c)
n (t); 8n 2 N; c 2 Nnfng
´
(16)
and the vector of interference prices
Ã(t) =
³
Ã(a)
n (t); 8n 2 N; a 2 Nnfng
´
(17)
are being updated are denoted by TÁ ½ T and TÃ ½ T ,
respectively. Here, TÁ denotes the set of time slots at which
the relay prices are updated and TÁ denotes the set of time
slots at which the interference prices are updated.
2) Pricing between each wireless relay node and its users:
In our model, each relay node n 2 N provides relay service
for its associated wireless users according to its relay prices.
At each time slot t 2 T , if user i 2 Dn wants to send data
to another user k 2 Dc (for c 6= n) at rate r
(k)
i (t), it needs to
pay r
(k)
i (t) Á
(c)
n (t) units of currency to wireless relay node n
as relay service charge. At time slot t, in total, user i pays
X
c2Nnfng
X
k2Dc
r
(k)
i (t) Á(c)
n (t): (18)
We assume that wireless relay node n assigns all its users
with a maximum allowed sending rate Rmax
n according to
its processing capacity. Each user i 2 Dn also maintains a
non-negative, increasing, and strictly concave utility function
g
(k)
i (r
(k)
i (t)) for any k 2 DnDn which indicates a monetary
measure of user i’s level of satisfaction from sending rate
r
(k)
i (t). Thus, user i adjusts its rates ri = (r
(k)
i (t); 8 k 2
DnDn) by solving the following local optimization problem
max
ri(t)º0
X
c2Nnfng
X
k2Dc
³
g
(k)
i (r
(k)
i (t)) ¡ r
(k)
i (t)Á(c)
n (t)
´
s.t.
X
c2Nnfng
X
k2Dc
r
(k)
i (t) · Rmax
n :
(19)
Notice that the objective function in (19) is always non-
negative as at least for ri =0, it is equal to zero. We deﬁne
user i’s proﬁt at each time slot t 2 T as
#i(t) =
0
@
X
n2Nnfng
X
k2Dc
g
(k)
i (r
(k)
i (t))
1
A
¡
0
@
X
n2Nnfng
(
X
k2Dc
r
(k)
i (t))Á(c)
n (t)
1
A:
(20)
From (19), user i adjusts ri(t) to maximize its proﬁt subject
to the total rate constraint. Unlike the network model in [18],
where each relay node can only support at most one user, here
we allow each relay node to support several users.
B. Resource Allocation
At each time slot t 2 T , given the advertised relay prices
from all its out-neighbors, node n2N can compute differential
relay price for any m2N out
n and each c2Nnfng as [18]
±(c)
nm(t) = Á(c)
n (t) ¡ Á(c)
m (t) ¡ Ámax; (21)
where Ámax = V maxUmax denotes the largest possible change
in any relay price during one time slot. Here,
V max = max
n V max
n (22)
and
Umax = max
n
©
¹max, out
n ;¹max, in
n + Rmax
n
ª
(23)
represent the largest possible change in any queue backlog,
where ¹max, in
n and ¹max, out
n are deﬁned in (4) and (5), re-
spectively. At the beginning of each time slot t 2 T , relay
node n measures !nm(t) for all of its outgoing wireless links
(n;m) 2 Lout
n and adjusts its transmission powers
pn(t) =
³
p(c)
nm(t);8c 2 Nnfng; m 2 N out
n
´
(24)
by solving the following local optimization problem
max
pn(t)º0
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
¹(c)
nm(p(t);!(t)) ±(c)
nm(t)
¡
0
@
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
p(c)
nm(t)
1
A
0
@
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(n)
a (t)
1
A
s.t.
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
p(c)
nm(t) · Pmax
n ;
p(c)
nm(t) = 0;
8 c 2 Nnfng;
m = 2 H
(c)
n or c 6= c?
nm(t)
or ±
(c)
nm(t) · 0;
(25)
where ¹
(c)
nm is as in (2), H
(c)
n is deﬁned in Section II, and
c?
nm(t) = arg max
c:m2H
(c)
n
±(c)
nm(t); 8n 2 N; m 2 N out
n : (26)
The optimal objective function in (25) is always non-negative
since at least when pn(t)=0, the objective function is equal
to zero. Comparing to the resource allocation problem in [18],
the objective function in (25) has an extra negative term
¡
0
@
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
p(c)
nm(t)
1
A
0
@
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(n)
a (t)
1
A; (27)
which denotes the total interference compensation charge that
wireless relay node n should pay to other relay nodes. By
solving (25), node n ﬁnds the trade-off between maximizing P
c2Nnfng
P
m2N out ¹
(c)
nm(p(t);!(t))±nm(t) (i.e., the original
objective function in [18]) and minimizing its interference
compensation cost. Each node then implements the same rout-
ing strategy as in [18]. That is, node n transmits commodity
c?
nm(t) data on link (n;m) as long as ±
(c
?
nm(t))
nm > 0. No
commodity c6=c?
nm(t) data is sent on link(n;m)at time t.
Theorem 1: Let p?
n(t) denote the optimal solution of prob-
lem (25). Assuming that K À 1 and all links operate in the
high SINR regime (cf. [4], [27]), for each neighboring relay
node m2N out
n and any commodity c 2 Nnfng, if c = c?
nm(t),
±
(c)
nm(t) > 0, and m 2 H
(c)
n , then
p?(c)
nm (t) = min
8
<
:
±
(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t)
P
a2Nnfng Ã
(n)
a (t)
;
±
(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t) Pmax
n
P
a2N out
n ±
(c
?
na(t))
na
9
=
;
;
(28)
otherwise, p
?(c)
nm (t) = 0.5
Theorem 1 provides a closed-form solution for the con-
strained optimization problem in (25). The proof of Theorem 1
is given in Appendix A. The key is to show that (28) satisﬁes
all the necessary and sufﬁcient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
optimality conditions (cf. [28]).
III. KEY PROPERTIES OF TWO-FOLD PRICING
Recall from Section II that each relay node n 2 N is an
independent commercial entity who wants to make money out
of its offered relay and connectivity services. In this regard,
at each time slot t2T we deﬁne node n’s proﬁt as
Ân(t) =
X
c2Nnfng
X
i2Dn
X
k2Dc
r
(k)
i (t) Á(c)
n (t)
+
X
m2N in
n
X
c2Nnfng
¹(c)
mn(p(t);w(t))Á(c)
n (t)
¡
X
m2N out
n
X
c2Nnfng
¹(c)
nm(p(t);w(t))Á(c)
m (t)
+
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(a)
n (t)
X
d2Nnfag
X
b2N out
a
p
(d)
ab (t)
¡
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(n)
a (t)
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
p(c)
nm(t):
(29)
The ﬁrst term in (29) is the total relay charges from all users
i 2 Dn. The second and the third terms denote the total
relay charges from and to all the neighboring relay nodes,
respectively. The fourth and the ﬁfth terms denote the total
interference charges from and to all other nodes a2Nnfng,
respectively. We are now ready to present our ﬁrst key result.
Theorem 2: For each T À 1 and any relay node n 2 N,
T X
t=0
Ân(t) ¸
T X
t=0
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(a)
n (t)
0
@
X
d2Nnfag
X
b2N out
a
p
(d)
ab (t)
1
A:
(30)
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix B. From
Theorem 2, each relay node is guaranteed to obtain a proﬁt
which is at least as high as the right-hand side (RHS) of
(30). All the terms in the RHS of (30) are non-negative. From
Assumptions 1 to 4, the RHS of (30) is zero only if for the
duration from time t = 0 to t = T, no relay node in set
Nnfng transmits any data and there is no data in any of the
N ¡ 1 queues in node n. This happens only if either N = 1
and there is no other relay node in the network or node n
has set its relay prices too high so that none of its users and
neighboring relay nodes are interested in transferring their data
to node n. The former is the case when there is no need to
relay node n as all users in set Dn = D can communicate
with each other directly. The latter is the case when node n is
reluctant to contribute as a part of the wireless access network.
Corollary 1: Each wireless relay node that contributes in
relaying data is guaranteed to receive a positive-valued proﬁt.
The proﬁt increases as the node forwards more packets.
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 are general and apply to any
choice of user utilities and pricing functions. Next, we deter-
mine the pricing functions ©
(c)
n and ª
(m)
n for all relay nodes
n 2 N, any commodity c 2 Nnfng, and any neighboring
relay node m 2 N out
n to maximize the network social welfare;
i.e., the aggregate proﬁt across all relay nodes and users
T X
t=1
X
n2N
Ân(t) +
T X
t=1
X
i2D
#i(t): (31)
Lemma 1: The social welfare model in (31) is equal to
T X
t=1
X
n2N
X
i2Dn
X
c2Nnfng
X
k2Dc
g
(k)
i (r
(k)
i (t)): (32)
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix C. From
Lemma 1, the monetary exchanges among the relay nodes
and the users cancel out each other. Eq. (32) is the aggregate
network utility across all users. Thus, maximizing the network
social welfare in our TFP model is equivalent to maximizing
the network utility. Therefore, we can use the recent results
from the literature on backpressure algorithms (cf. [18], [23],
[24], [29], [30]) and obtain the interference and relay prices
such that we can maximize the aggregate network utility.
From [24] and [30], the network utility is maximized if we
periodically solve the following global optimization problem
max
p(t)º0
X
n2N
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
¹(c)
nm(p(t);!(t)) ±(c)
nm(t0)
s.t.
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
p(c)
nm(t) · Pmax
n ; 8n 2 N
p(c)
nm(t) = 0;
8n2N; c2Nnfng;
m = 2 H
(c)
n or c 6= c?
nm(t0)
or ±
(c)
nm(t0) · 0:
(33)
Problem (33) is a maximum weight matching problem. The
objective function in (33) is a weighted summation of the link
data rates for all links in the network. For each link (n;m), the
weight is proportional (see the differential relay price model
in (21)) to the difference between the queue length at the
transmitter node n and the queue length at the receiver node
m. By maximizing the objective function in (33), we aim to
balance the queue lengths at the network nodes. This leads
to stabilizing the network queues [30, Theorem 4]) and also
reaching the maximum aggregate network utility [24]. From
Lemma 1, it also leads to maximum network social welfare.
Therefore, our job is to determine the interference and relay
prices to solve the maximum weight matching problem (33).
Theorem 3: Given T (i.e., the set of time slots), T! (i.e.,
the set of time slots at which the vector of channel states !
changes), and ¤À1 (i.e., the fading parameter), let
TÁ = T!; TÃ = T ; and ¨ = ¤; (34)
where T!, TÃ, and ¨ are deﬁned in Section II-A. The
aggregate network utility and the network social welfare are
maximized if each node n2N at each time slot t02TÁ sets
©(c)
n = V U(c)
n (t0); 8c2Nnfng; (35)
and at each time t 2 ft0;:::;t0 + ¨g each node n 2 N sets
ª(a)
n =
X
m2N out
n
ham
maxf±
(c
?
nm(t
0))
nm (t0);0g
Inm(p¡n(t¡1)) + ´m
; 8a2Nnfng; (36)6
Algorithm 1 Executed by each wireless relay node n 2 N
1: Randomly choose the prices and transmission powers.
2: repeat
3: Transmit commodity c 2 Nnfng data to node m 2 H
(c)
n
with power p
(c)
nm.
4: if t 2 TÁ then
5: for all commodity c 2 Nnfng do
6: Set Á
(c)
n = V U
(c)
n .
7: end
8: Inform Án=(Á
(c)
n ; 8c 6= n) to neighbors and users.
9: for all out-neighbors m 2 N out
n do
10: for all commodity c 2 Nnfng do
11: Set ±
(c)
nm = Á
(c)
n ¡ Á
(c)
m ¡ Ámax.
12: end
13: Set c?
nm = argmaxc:m2H
(c)
n ±nm(c).
14: end
15: end
16: if t 2 TÃ then
17: for all relay nodes a 2 Nnfng do
18: Set Ã
(a)
n =
P
m2N out
n ( ham
Inm+´m)maxf±
(c
?
nm)
nm ;0g.
19: end
20: Inform Ãn = (Ã
(a)
n ; 8a 6= n) to all other nodes.
21: Set pn = 0.
22: for all out-neighbors m 2 N out
n do
23: if
P
m2N out
n ±
(c
?
nm)
nm · Pmax
n (
P
a2Nnfng Ã
(n)
a ) then
24: Set p
(c)
nm = ±
(c
?
nm)
nm =(
P
a2Nnfng Ã
(n)
a ).
25: else
26: Set p
(c)
nm = (±
(c
?
nm)
nm Pmax
n )=(
P
a2N out
n ±
(c
?
na)
na ).
27: end
28: end
29: end
30: Charge any node m 2 N in
n and any i 2 Dn for relaying
commodity c 6= n data at price Á
(c)
n :
31: Pay any node m 2 N out
n for relaying commodity c 6= n
data at price Á
(c)
m .
32: Charge any other node a 6= n for the interference it
causes on node n at price Ã
(a)
n .
33: Pay any other node a 6= n for the interference node
n causes on it at price Ã
(n)
a .
34: until the wireless relay node n switches off.
where V > 0 is an arbitrary design parameter. Notice that here
Inm(p¡n(t¡1)) denotes the most recent measurement of the
interference power at the receiver node of link (n;m).
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix D. The
key is to show that our proposed two-fold pricing functions
result in solving the maximum weight matching problem
periodically (i.e., every ¨ = ¤ time slots). Together, Theorems
2 and 3 show that if the transmission powers, relay prices,
and interference prices are set according to (28), (35), and
(36), respectively, then not only each relay node receives a
guaranteed positive proﬁt, but also the social welfare and the
network utility are maximized. The pseudocode of the pricing
algorithms that each node and each user need to execute are
given in Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. In lines 5 to 7
Algorithm 2 Executed by each wireless user i 2 Dn
1: repeat
2: Set the rates ri by solving problem (19).
3: Pay node n for commodity c 6= n data at price Á
(c)
n .
4: until the wireless user i switches off or leaves the network.
and lines 17 to 19 of Algorithm 1, the relay and interference
prices are adjusted according to Theorem 3, respectively. On
the other hand, in lines 21 to 28, the transmission powers are
set according to Theorem 1. Notice that Algorithm 2 simply
adjusts the transmission rates of the users based on the optimal
solutions of the proﬁt maximization problem in (19).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
TFP scheme and compare it with two recently proposed single-
fold pricing strategies. In particular, we compared TFP with
the single-fold relay pricing (SFRP) scheme in [18] and the
single-fold interference pricing (SFIP) scheme in [10]. For the
pricing model in [18], only the relay prices are taken into
account and the network is assumed to be interference-free.
On the other hand, for the pricing model in [10], only the
interference prices are considered and it is assumed that all
relay nodes are willing to relay data for other relay nodes free
of charge. We consider three performance metrics: 1) network
social welfare, 2) fairness index, and 3) aggregate network
throughput. The fairness index is calculated among the proﬁts
that the wireless relay nodes achieve [31]
³P
n2N
PT
t=1 Ân(t)
´2
N
P
n2N
³PT
t=1 Ân(t)
´2; (37)
where T = 5000 is the simulation time. Clearly, for the case
of SFRP, the proﬁt for each node includes the balance of the
received and paid prices only for relay prices. Similarly, for
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Fig. 2. Network social welfare when the number of wireless relay nodes N
varies from 10 to 50. Each relay node provides network connectivity for 5
users. Each point is the average of the measurements for all ten topologies.7
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Fig. 3. Network throughput when the number of relay nodes N varies from
10 to 50. Each point is the average of the measurements for all ten topologies.
the case of SFIP, the proﬁt for each node includes the balance
of the received and paid prices only for interference prices. In
the simulation model, each wireless relay node n provides the
connectivity for jDnj = 5 wireless users. Each wireless user
is interested in sending data to two other (randomly selected)
users inside the network. We consider ten different random
topologies. In each topology, the wireless relay nodes are
randomly located in a 1 km £ 1 km square ﬁeld and the
communication range is 200 m. There is a link between any
two neighboring wireless relay nodes if they are within the
communication range of each other. For each wireless relay
node n 2 N, we have: Pmax
n = 20 W and Rmax
n = 100 kbps.
The transmission power, relay prices, and the interference
prices are set according to (28), (35), and (36), respectively.
The unit of currency is selected such that for a unit queue
backlog, relaying 1 Mbps data costs 1 cent, i.e., 0.01 dollar.
Unless stated otherwise, we assume the presence of slow-
fading channels with the fading parameter ¤ = 10. The impact
of fast-fading is also studied in Section IV-C.
A. Performance Comparison with Single-Fold Pricing
The network social welfare, where the number of relay
nodes N varies from 10 to 50, is shown in Fig. 2. In this ﬁgure,
each point is the average of the measurements for all 10 sim-
ulated topologies. We can see that the proposed TFP scheme
always outperforms the SFRP and SFIP strategies and results
in higher network social welfare1. Notice that, from Theorem
3, TFP indeed leads to achieving the maximum network social
welfare. Considering the case where the number of relay nodes
N =50, TFP results in 24.6% and 36.7% higher network social
welfare compared to SFRP and SFIP, respectively. We can also
see that SFRP outperforms the SFIP scheme. This is due to
1Notice that from Lemma 1, the network social welfare when TFP is
used is equal to aggregate network utility. We can easily show that a similar
statement is true when SFRP is used. Therefore, to have a fair comparison,
we also considered the aggregate network utility as the network social welfare
when SFIP is used. Otherwise, the network social welfare for SFIP would be
signiﬁcantly less than the values shown in Fig. 2.
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n N =50 and the communication channels experience slow-fading (i.e.,
¤ = 10): (a) Network social welfare, (b) Fairness index among the proﬁts
achieved by wireless relay nodes, and (c) Aggregate network throughput.
the fact that SFIP does not take into account the information
about the trafﬁc load (e.g., queue backlog) and the link state
information. In fact, SFIP simply assumes inﬁnite backlog in
all queues in the network. In contrary, our proposed TFP model
takes into account the wireless interference, load information,
and channel states leading to signiﬁcantly better performance.
Next, we compare the throughout in TFP, SFRP, and SFIP.
Results are shown in Fig. 3. We can see that TFP can increase
the throughput signiﬁcantly compared to both SFRP and SFIP
schemes. Considering the case where N = 50, the proposed
TFP results in 14.7% and 21.2% higher aggregate throughput
compared to SFRP and SFIP, respectively.
The exact value of the social welfare, fairness index, and
throughput for each of the 10 simulated topologies, where N =
50, are shown in Fig. 4 (a), (b), and (c), respectively. From Fig.
4 (a) and (c), TFP always results in higher social welfare and
higher throughput compared to both SFRP and SFIP. From Fig.
4 (b), TFP also always acts more fair. Recall from Theorem 2
that TFP guarantees high positive proﬁts for all relay nodes. In
fact, compared to SFRP, having the interference prices in the
TFP scheme helps those relay nodes that do not experience
high trafﬁc demand. Instead, they make some money out of
the interference charges. This results in a more fair revenue
distribution among the nodes. On average, TFP leads to 18.3%8
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Fig. 5. Trend of the maximum weight matching objective £(t) versus time
slots: (a) During the whole simulation time, i.e., 5000 time slots, (b) During
the ﬁrst 200 time slots. Notice that every ¨ = ¤ = 10 time slots, the
channel states change randomly and the maximum weight matching objective
converges to its new optimal value accordingly.
higher fairness index compared to SFRP. We further notice that
SFIP shows poor performance in terms of fairness. In fact,
since SFIP is based on the assumption of free relay service,
in this case the only monetary exchange among the relay nodes
is the interference prices. The interference prices only depend
on the network topology, not the trafﬁc load relayed by each
node. Therefore, when it comes to the proﬁt made by each
node, SFIP does not show an acceptable performance.
B. Maximum Weight Matching
Recall from Section III that both TFP and SFIP aim to solve
the maximum weight matching problem in (33). Therefore, it
is interesting to compare TFP and SFIP in terms of maximizing
the objective value in (33). At each time slot t2T , we deﬁne
£(t) =
X
n2N
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
¹(c)
nm(p(t);!(t)) ±(c)
nm(t0); (38)
where t0 is the smallest time slot in set T! such that: t ¸ t0. In
other words, t0 is the most recent time slot at which the vector
of channel states ! has changed. We notice that, £(t) is indeed
the same as the objective function in the maximum weight
matching problem in (33). From Theorem 3, TFP results
in maximum network social welfare and maximum network
utility by periodically solving the optimization problem (33),
i.e., maximizing the values of £(t). This is illustrated in
Fig. 5. In this ﬁgure, the trend of £(t) for topology number
1 is shown versus the time slots. Notice that, the fading
parameter ¤ = 10. Thus, the vector of channel states !
changes randomly every 10 time slots. This implies that the
optimal solution of the maximum weight matching problem
also changes every 10 time slots2. For proper operation, TFP
needs to converge to the new optimal solution accordingly.
This is shown in the zoomed area in Fig. 5 (b). Clearly,
the convergence is fast. From the results in Fig. 5 (a) and
(b), we can also see that TFP always results in substantially
higher maximum weight matching objective £(t), compared
to SFRP. The higher the maximum weight matching objective,
the higher is the aggregate network utility [24]. From Lemma
1, this also implies higher network social welfare.
C. Impact of Fast-Fading
In the previous experiments, we assumed that the channels
experience slow-fading. In this section, we study the impact of
fast-fading. Results for all the ten simulated topologies, where
the number of relay nodes N = 50 and the fading parameter
¤ = 2, are shown in Fig. 6. In this scenario, the channel states
change randomly every 2 time slots. This implies that the
optimal solution of the maximum weight matching problem
also changes every 2 time slots. As a result, our proposed
distributed transmission power adjustment mechanism (see
lines 22 to 29 in Algorithm 1) does not have enough time
to converge to the new optimal solution of the maximum
weight matching problem after each change in the channel
states. Thus, the optimal performance may not be achieved.
Nevertheless, from the results in Fig. 6(a) and 6(c), TFP still
results in 46.3% higher network social welfare and 32.4%
higher aggregate throughput, compared to SFRP. On the other
hand, from Fig. 6 (b), TFP is 35.2% more fair compared to
SFRP in this scenario. Similar results are obtained compared to
SFIP scheme. Notice that SFIP has slightly better performance
than SFRP in presence of fast fading channels. That is due to
the fact that SFIP assigns prices only based on the network
topology, not the channel states. Thus, unlike SFRP, SFIP is
not noticeably affected by fast fading.
In summary, assuming the presence of slow-fading channels,
our proposed TFP scheme leads to not only higher aggregate
proﬁt across the nodes and users, but also more fair revenue
distribution among the relay nodes. The former results from
Theorem 3 while the latter results from Theorem 2. Both fea-
tures are also conﬁrmed through extensive simulation studies.
Furthermore, TFP can also signiﬁcantly increase the network
aggregate throughput. When the underlying communication
channels experience fast-fading, although TFP still results
in substantially better performance compared to SFRP and
2That is why the interval for solving problem (33) must be at least 10.9
SFIP as the simulation results indicate, achieving the optimal
performance may not always be guaranteed.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a market-based wireless access
network model with two-fold pricing (TFP), where several
self-interested wireless relay nodes provide connectivity for
a number of wireless users. The relay-prices are used as
incentives to encourage nodes to collaborate and forward
each other’s packets. The interference-prices are also used
to leverage optimal resource allocation. Together, the relay
and interference prices incorporate both cooperative and com-
petitive interactions among the nodes. The positive proﬁt for
each individual wireless relay node is guaranteed for a wide
range of pricing functions. The relay and interference pricing
functions are then determined to maximize the network social
welfare and aggregate network utility. Compared with the
single-fold relay pricing (SFRP) scheme in [18], where only
the relay prices are taken into account, as well as the single-
fold interference pricing (SFIP) scheme in [10], where only
the interference prices are considered, simulation results show
that TFP signiﬁcantly increases the network social welfare and
aggregate throughput. TFP also leads to more fair revenue
sharing and better proﬁt distribution among the wireless relay
nodes. Therefore, TFP leads to a wireless access network
with multiple independent service providers which not only
operates at optimal performance, but also is beneﬁcial for each
individual wireless service provider.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Knowing that all the constraints are linear and the objective
function is concave, problem (25) is a convex optimization
problem. Therefore, it has a unique local (thus global) optimal
solution. In a high SINR regime, the optimal solution should
satisfy the following necessary and sufﬁcient Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions [32, Proposition 3.3.1]
for each out-neighbor node m 2 N out
n :
±
(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t)
p
?(c?
nm(t))
nm (t)
¡
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(n)
a (t) = ¸?
n¡¾?
nm; (39)
¸?
n
2
4
X
m2N out
n
p
?(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t)¡ Pmax
n
3
5 = 0; (40)
¾?
nmp
?(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t) = 0; (41)
¸?
n ¸ 0; (42)
¾?
nm ¸ 0; (43)
where ¸?
n denotes the Lagrange multiplier corresponding
to constraint
P
m2N out
n p
?(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t) · Pmax
n and ¾?
nm de-
notes the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to constraint
p
?(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t) ¸ 0 for each wireless link (n;m) 2 Lout
n . We
can show that if
X
m2N out
n
±
(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t) < P max
n
0
@
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(n)
a (t)
1
A; (44)
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Fig. 6. Simulation results for each of the 10 random simulated topologies
when N = 50 and the communication channels experience fast-fading (i.e.,
¤ = 2): (a) Network social welfare, (b) Fairness index among the proﬁts
achieved by wireless relay nodes, and (c) Aggregate network throughput.
then the KKT conditions (39)-(43) are satisﬁed by setting
¸?
n = 0 and ¾?
nm = 0 for all links (n;m) 2 Lout
n . In
this case, for each link (n;m) 2 Lout
n and any commodity
c = c?
nm(t) such that ±
(c)
nm(t) > 0, we have p
?(c)
nm (t) =
±
(c
?
nm(t))
nm =(
P
a2Nnfng Ã
(n)
a (t)). On the other hand, if
X
m2N out
n
±
(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t) ¸ Pmax
n
0
@
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(n)
a (t)
1
A; (45)
then the KKT conditions are satisﬁed by setting ¾?
nm = 0 for
all links (n;m) 2 Lout
n and
¸?
n =
1
Pmax
n
X
m2N out
n
±
(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t) ¡
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(n)
a (t)
by (45)
¸ 0:
(46)
Notice that, in this case, for each link (n;m) 2 Lout
n and
any commodity c = c?
nm(t) such that ±
(c)
nm(t) > 0, we have
p
?(c)
nm (t) = ±
(c
?
nm(t))
nm (t) Pmax
n =
³P
a2N out
n ±
(c
?
na(t))
na (t)
´
. Thus,
since pn(t) is the only point that satisﬁes the KKT conditions
in (39)-(43), it is indeed the unique global optimal solution
for the local transmission power control problem in (25). ¥10
B. Proof of Theorem 2
From (21) and (29), for any node n2N and at any time t2T ,
Ân(t)
= Ân(t) +
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
¹(c)
nm(p(t);!(t))±(c)
nm(t)
¡
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X
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n (t)
X
d2Nnfag
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b2N out
a
p
(d)
ab (t):
(47)
Since the optimal objective function in (25) is non-negative,
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
¹(c)
nm(p(t);!(t)) ±(c)
nm(t)
¡
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(n)
a (t)
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
p(c)
nm(t) ¸ 0:
(48)
Following the proof of [18, Theorem 2b], we can also show
that
X
c2Nnfng
0
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(49)
By replacing (48) and (49) in (21) we have
Ân(t) ¸
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(m)
n (t)
X
d2Nnfag
X
b2N out
a
p
(d)
ab (t): (50)
Adding up both sides for any time slot t = 1;:::;T, the
inequality in (30) is resulted. ¥
C. Proof of Lemma 1
Replacing #i(t) and Ân(t) in (31) by (20) and (29),
T X
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X
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T X
t=1
X
n2N
X
i2Dn
X
c2Nnfng
X
k2Dc
g
(k)
i (r
(k)
i (t)):
(51)
The last line in (51) is indeed the same as (32). Notice that
X
n2N
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N in
n
¹(c)
mn(p(t);w(t))Á(c)
n (t)
=
X
n2N
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
¹(c)
nm(p(t);w(t))Á(c)
m (t);
(52)11
and
X
n2N
X
a2Nnfng
X
d2Nnfag
X
b2N out
a
Ã(a)
n (t) p
(d)
ab (t)
=
X
n2N
X
a2Nnfng
X
c2Nnfng
X
m2N out
n
Ã(n)
a (t) p(c)
nm(t):
(53)
In (52), the left hand side denotes the aggregate relay price
that all wireless relay nodes receive while the right hand side
denotes the aggregate relay price all wireless relay nodes
pay. Similarly, in (53), the left hand side is the aggregate
interference price that all wireless relay nodes receive while
the right hand side is the aggregate interference price all
wireless relay nodes pay. ¥
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Given t0 2 TÁ, for each time slot t 2 ft0;:::;t0+¨g, consider
two arbitrary non-negative valued transmission power vectors
~ p(t) and ^ p(t) such that
~ p(t) ¹ ^ p(t); (54)
where the inequality is interpreted coordinate-wise. That is,
for any wireless link (n;m) 2 L and each commodity c 2
Nnfng, we have ~ p
(c)
nm(t) · ^ p
(c)
nm(t). From (3), we can show
that for each n 2 N and any m 2 N out
n we have
Inm(~ p¡n(t)) · Inm(^ p¡n(t)); (55)
1
(Inm(~ p¡n(t)) + ´m)
¸
1
(Inm(^ p¡n(t)) + ´m)
; (56)
Ã(a)
n (~ p(t)) ¸ Ã
(a)
n (^ p(t)); (57)
Thus, for each n 2 N, we have
1
P
a2Nnfng Ã
(n)
a (~ p(t))
·
1
P
a2Nnfng Ã
(n)
a (^ p(t))
: (58)
Replacing (58) in (28), we have
~ p(t + 1) ¹ ^ p(t + 1): (59)
From (54) and (59), the update formulation in (28) forms
a monotone mapping [33]. Monotone mappings satisfy both
synchronous convergence and box conditions [33, pp. 431].
Thus, from the asynchronous convergence theorem [33], the
transmission powers will converge to a ﬁxed point, assuming
that ¨ = ¤ is large enough. By deﬁnition, p? should denote
the optimal solution of the local optimization problem in (25)
for all relay nodes. Next, we show that p? also denotes the
unique optimal solution of the maximum weight matching
problem in (33). Notice that the objective function in (33)
is different from the objective function in (25) as it is the
weighted summation of the data rates over all links. Problem
(33) is indeed the key resource allocation problem to be
solved by the backpressure algorithms [23], [24]. Using the
logarithmic change of variables (cf. [4, Theorem 1]), we can
transform problem (33) to an equivalent convex problem. Thus,
problem (33) has a unique global optimal solution (cf. [32]).
Let p¤ denote the unique optimal solution of problem (33).
From KKT conditions, for each n2N and m2N out
n we have
±
(c?
nm(t0))
nm (t
0)
p
¤(c?
nm(t0))
nm (t)
¡
X
a 2 Nnfng;
b 2 Nout
a (t)
hnb
±
(d
?
ab(t
0))
ab (t0)
In(p¤
¡n(t)) + ´b
= ½¤
n¡%¤
nm; (60)
½¤
n
0
@
X
m2N out
n
p
¤(c
?
nm(t
0))
nm (t) ¡ Pmax
n
1
A = 0; (61)
%¤
nmp
¤(c
?
nm(t
0))
nm (t) = 0; (62)
½?
n ¸ 0; %¤
nm ¸ 0; (63)
where for each node n 2 N, ½¤
n denotes the Lagrange mul-
tiplier corresponding to constraint
P
m2N out
n p
¤(c
?
nm(t
0))
nm (t) ·
Pmax
n and %¤
nm denotes the Lagrange multiplier corresponding
to constraint p
¤(c
?
nm(t
0))
nm (t) ¸ 0. Comparing with (40)-(43),
the KKT conditions (61)-(63) hold if we set p¤ = p?,
½¤
n = ¸?
n, and %¤
nm = ¾?
nm, for all nodes n 2 N and all
links (n;m)2Lout
n . In this case, since
X
a2Nnfng
X
b2N out
a
hnb
±
(d
?
ab(t
0))
ab (t0)
In(p¤
¡n) + ´b
by (36)
=
X
a2Nnfng
Ã(n)
a (t);
the KKT condition in (60) is also resulted from (39). Thus,
p¤ = p? is indeed the unique optimal solution of the maximum
weight matching problem in (33). In other words, given the
interference pricing model in (36), problem (33) is solved
every ¨ = ¤ time slots. This, together with (35), results in
achieving maximum network utility (cf. [24] and [30, Theorem
4]). From Lemma 1, obtaining the maximum network utility
also implies achieving maximum social welfare. ¥
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